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et al.: Constitutional Law--Discretionary Acts of Governor
ABSTRACTS

Constitutional Law-Discretionary Acts of Governor
Petitioner, Bache and Co., Inc., was employed by Arch A.
Moore, Jr., Governor of the State of West Virginia, to act as
financial advisor in the sale of road bonds in the amount of
$90,000,000 during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970. Bache
was to receive 90 cents for each $1,000 of principal of the bonds
sold. Pursuant to this agreement the petitioner, after providing
extensive advice, submitted to the Governor a statement of its
charge for the services-$81,000. The statement was transferred to
the State Road Commissioner, who upon instructions from the
Governor, submitted it to the defendant, the Honorable Denzil L.
Gainer, Auditor of the State of West Virginia, with a requisition
of the State Treasury for payment from the State Road Fund.
Defendant refused to issue a warrant, claiming that the charge was
not a necessary expense within the meaning of the applicable statutes,
[Chapter 125 and 126, Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session,
1969] and, that the advisor's agreement lacked the required approval
of the Director of Purchasing and the Attorney General of the State,
and the signature of the Commissioner of Finance and Administration, as provided in Chapter 5A, Article 3, Code, 1931, as amended.
The Governor again submitted the statement to the Commissioner of the Department of Highways (formerly State Road
Commissioner), stating that the charge was a necessary expense
incurred in the execution by the Governor of the Acts of the Legislature and was payable out of the State Road Fund. However,
defendant again refused to issue his warrant upon the Commissioner's
requisition. The petitioner then instituted an original mandamus
proceeding, seeking a writ to require the defendant to issue a warrant
upon the State Treasurer for payment for its services.
Held, writ awarded. The Court said that the charge for
petitioner's services was a necessary expense within the meaning of
Chapters 125 and 126, Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session,
1969, and held that when there are funds available in the State
Treasury to pay such expense, it is the responsibility of the Auditor
to honor the requisition. The Court further held that Section 13
of each statute impliedly empowered the Governor to determine
what expenses incurred in the sale of the bonds were necessary
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expenses, and that such determination was not subject to review or
approval by any other officer or governmental department. Bache
and Co., v. Gainer 177 S.E.2d 10 (W. Va. 1970).
In the past the Court has been somewhat reluctant to use
mandamus to coerce state officials to act because of the wide range
of discretion available to executive officials in discharging their
duties. But in recent years the Court has relaxed its views, and today
mandamus has become a popular judicial device to secure individual
rights vis-a-vis the state. See Davis, Mandamus to Review Administrative Action in W. Va. 60 W. VA. L. REv. 1, (1957). See also,
Annot., 91 A.L.R. 1497 (1934).
Criminal Law-Jurisdiction To Revoke Probation
In February, 1965, defendant represented by counsel pleaded
guilty to a charge of forgery and in March was sentenced to a term
of one to ten years in the state penitentiary. However, the sentence
was suspended and the defendant was placed on probation for three
years. Then in February, 1967, defendant pleaded guilty to a
misdemeanor and was sentenced to the county jail for six months.
The circuit court, vested with supervisory authority over the
defendant, revoked the defendant's probation and ordered him to
serve the suspended sentence in the state penitentiary. The defendant
was without counsel at the revocation of probation hearing.
In April, 1968, after the probationary period had expired, the
defendant instituted a habeas corpus proceeding in the circuit court
alleging that the revocation of his probation was unlawful and void
because he had been without counsel at the revocation of probation
hearing. The circuit court agreed, and he was released. However,
the same circuit court ordered a second revocation of probation
hearing to be conducted and at that hearing ruled that the defendant
had violated the terms of the probation. While incarcerated in the
state penitentiary, the defendant appealed this second revocation
of probation. Held, circuit court's ruling reversed. The circuit
court did not have jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation after
the period of probation had expired. State v. Shawyer, 177 S.E.2d
25 (W. Va. 1970).
In West Virginia once the probationary period has expired, a
court cannot revoke the defendant's probation. State v. Reel, 152
W.Va. 646, 165 S.E.2d 813 (1969). Generally a revocation of pro-
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